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THE FAINT SHADOW OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT:
SUBSTANTIAL IMBALANCE IN EVIDENCE-GATHERING
CAPACITY ABROAD UNDER THE U.S.-P.R.C. MUTUAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS
David Whedbeet
Abstract: Transnational organized crime has an adverse impact on the United
States and the People's Republic of China. In the last thirty years, the mutual legal
assistance agreement has emerged as an effective mechanism to streamline international
judicial assistance in combating borderless crime. The accretion of these agreements has
created a growing web of bilateral obligations that links sovereign jurisdictions. The
U.S.-P.R.C. mutual legal assistance agreement (the "U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA") furthers U.S.
interests by facilitating U.S. Attomeys' access to physical evidence and witnesses in the
People's Republic of China. Significantly, the political offense exception in the U.S.-
P.R.C. agreement permits U.S. authorities to avoid complicity in Chinese prosecutions of
political dissidents and religious minorities. Missing from these arrangements, however,
is consideration of U.S. constitutional safeguards that should accompany the expanded
power of U.S. law enforcement abroad. While prosecutors can exchange evidence
directly under the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, defendants must resort to discretionary access to
evidence abroad under the antiquated letters rogatory system. This imbalance may
infringe on the defendant's right to compulsory process. Given the very broad "state
secrets" exception under Chinese law, defendants may be unable to obtain exculpatory
evidence from the People's Republic of China. The defendant's right to confrontation
may also be compromised in the Chinese context. The widely acknowledged Chinese
police practice of coercion of the accused and incarcerated may stifle truthfulness,
undermining the genuine opportunity for defense counsel to reliably cross-examine a
Chinese witness in police custody. By allowing defendants in U.S. criminal proceedings
more reliable access to evidence in the People's Republic of China under the U.S.-P.R.C.
MLAA framework, the protection of U.S. constitutional rights to compulsory process
would be enhanced.
1. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 2000, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Director of the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, announced the signing of an
Executive Agreement between the United States and the People's Republic
of China Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters ("the
U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA").' Now known as the "McCaffrey Announcement,"
t The author would like to thank Professor John Junker for his comments, and Professor James W.
Whedbee, and Sandra Hughes for their unwavering support. Any errors or omissions are the author's own.
1 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 19, 2000, U.S.-P.R.C.,
(unpublished) (on file with U.S. Dept. of State, Office of Treaty Affairs) [hereinafter U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA].
See Drug Control Policy Chief on US -China Agreement: U.S., China Sign Mutual Legal Assistance
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the declaration stressed "the common threat" of heroin and
methamphetarnine addiction facing both countries, and the formation of the
Sino-American Joint Liaison Group2 as an initial "door leading to a wider
cooperation against drugs."3  The McCaffrey Announcement signaled a
resumption of closer Sino-American cooperation on criminal matters since
the informal judicial assistance in "Operation Goldfish ' 4 that led to the
diplomatic debacle in Wang v. Reno.
5
The Wang case exposed coercive practices used in the Chinese
criminal justice system to influence a witness who was eventually
transferred to the United States to testify.6  For apparent political reasons,
the agents of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security ("MPS") tortured
Wang until he gave a false statement that the heroin at issue in "Operation
Goldfish" had originated in Hong Kong, and not People's Republic of China
("P.R.C.").7  Because U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") operatives
knowingly overlooked evidence of coercion, once on the stand, Wang was
put in the intolerable position of perjuring himself or truthfully testifying at
the risk of execution upon return to the P.R.C.8 Accordingly, the federal
Agreement, at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina//McCaffrey.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter McCaffrey Announcement).
Following the 1997 U.S.-China Summit, the Joint Liaison Group was formed to promote
cooperation in the field of law. See United States Information Service, Washington File, released June. 27,
1998, available at http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF980629/epfl04.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2003). The McCaffrey Announcement was made at the fourth Joint Liaison Group meeting. See
McCaffrey Announcement, supra note 1.
3 McCaffry Announcement, supra note 1.
4 "Operation Goldfish" commenced when Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officials learned that
authorities in Shanghai had intercepted a shipment of heroin concealed in the cavities of goldfish bound for
San Francisco. See Wang v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1514 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
1996). The subsequent sting operation involved a beeper placed in the shipment by Chinese Ministry of
Public Security ("MPS") agents that culminated in the arrests of Chico Wong in the United States, Leung
Pak Leung in Hong Kong, and Wang Zong Xiao in Shanghai. Id. at 1512-1514. In an unprecedented act of
judicial cooperation, Wang, also under indictment in the P.R.C. for his role, was transferred to the United
States to testify against Leung, the alleged "mastermind" from Hong Kong. Id. at 1534, 1537. See also 9th
Circuit Grills Prosecutors on Human Rights Issues Surrounding Chinese Witness in "Goldfish " Drug
Case, 11, No. 5 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REPT. (May 1995).
The Wang case created a diplomatic debacle that chilled Sino-American judicial cooperation until
1998, when the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") established a secret electronic surveillance post along
the Chinese-Burmese border to track smuggling operations. See China and U.S. Resume Unprecedented
Drug Enforcement Cooperation, 14, No. 12 INT'L LAW ENFORCEMENT REPT. (Dec. 1998). The CIA set up
a secret operations fund, a law enforcement liaison group, and prospective real-time e-mail information
exchange on drug trafficking and traffickers. Id.
6 Wang, 837 F. Supp. at 1511-14.
Id. at 1513.
Id. at 1551. "If the Court does not invoke its equitable powers to remedy the constitutional abuses
discussed herein, Wang will receive the harshest possible treatment upon his return to the [P.R.C.]; in all
likelihood, the Chinese government will execute him for his attempt to vindicate his constitutional rights in
this country." Id. at 1563.
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district court found prosecutorial misconduct 9 that violated the witness' right
to substantive due process.'
l
The Wang case demonstrated the importance of a neutral court's
capacity to exercise its supervisory powers to protect a witness and to ensure
that witness testimony in U.S. proceedings is free of the taint of coercion."
More generally, Wang demonstrated some of the problems of gathering
evidence extraterritorially when two incongruous criminal justice systems
are involved. The bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty ("MLAT") has
emerged in the last three decades as a mechanism to accommodate such
structural disparities. 12 MLATs provide a framework for prosecutors to
overcome specific legal barriers in another jurisdiction that hinder the
process of obtaining evidence abroad.1 3  The magnitude of transnational
organized crime faced by the United States and the P.R.C. warrants the
enhanced prosecutorial power gained by such an MLAT.14  Because the
United States has signed MLATs with other East Asian nations known to
harbor or produce organized crime groups, international judicial engagement
with the P.R.C. is an expected course.1
5
9 The court found that, among other breaches of duty, DEA agents ignored clear indications of
P.R.C. police coercion, failed to consider videotape evidence of torture, failed to prepare P.R.C. officials
accompanying Wang for cross-examination, and lied to the court about knowledge of mistreatment. Id. at
1551-58.
'o Id. at 1551. The court ruled that the prosecution's indifference to Wang's dilemma amounted to
gross negligence that "shocked the conscience." Id. (relying on standard enunciated in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
1 Prior to Wang's testimony, defense counsel had asked Wang about his treatment in Chinese
prison, to which Wang replied, as instructed by his Chinese custodians, that his treatment was "fair." Id. at
1535. Discovery that an MPS agent had taken notes of Wang's interrogations in Shanghai prompted
defense counsel to give notice of his intention to cross-examine Wang about possible coercion in Shanghai.
Id. at. 1535-36. After testifying at trial twice in the presence of his Chinese custodians that Leung was
present at the heroin purchase (consistent with the MPS agents' instructions), Wang reversed himself and
testified that the defendant was not present at the sale. Id. at 1537.
12 See generally ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 323-96 (1993). These agreements may be treaties requiring Senate ratifications
[hereinafter MLAT's], precursor mutual legal assistance agreements eventually submitted to the Senate for
treaty ratification [hereinafter MLAA], or executive agreements on mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters not requiring Senate approval [hereinafter also MLAA]. "MLAT" is a generic reference used in
this Comment. See discussion infra Part ill.
13 See Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Mafia ": Recent Russian Legislation and
Increased Bilateral Cooperation May Provide the Means, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 207 (1996). See also
discussion infra Part III.
14 See JOHN KERRY, THE NEW WAR: THE WEB OF CRIME THAT THREATENS AMERICA'S SECURITY
53, (1997); Niall Fraser, Triads Stake Claims in Mainland Goldrush, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July
18, 2002, at 3; Damien McElroy, Bejing Declares War As Triads Fuel Crime Wave, THE SCOTSMAN, Feb.
23, 2001, at 14. See also discussion infra Part II.
15 The United States currently has MLATs with the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong,
and Russia. See MICHAEL ABBELL, OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CRIMINAL CASES, app. C, A-45
(2002).
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Missing from these MLAT arrangements, however, is the
consideration of U.S. constitutional safeguards that should also accompany
the flexed power of U.S. law enforcement abroad. Significantly, MLATs
generally bar "private persons" (i.e. defendants) from utilizing this
streamlined process of gathering evidence outside U.S. jurisdictions. 6 As
the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") increases its jurisdictional reach
through an expanding web of MLATs, defendants must be afforded
comparable access to evidence to ensure fundamental trial faimess. The
U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA exemplifies this constitutional deficiency inherent in the
MLAT framework.
Part II provides a general background of transnational organized
crime, assessing the threat of organized crime in the United States and the
P.R.C. Part III examines the structure of the MLAT as a tool for obtaining
evidence abroad. It discusses the process of harmonization of intemational
law enforcement through an expansion of U.S. MLATs, both to prosecute
crime and to accommodate disparate criminal justice systems in a consistent
procedural framework. Part IV presents the substance and scope of the U.S.-
P.R.C. MLAA, with special attention to the agreement's "political offense"
exception to judicial assistance.
Although MLATs are an appropriate response to transnational crime,
this Comment contends in Part V that the purported "harmonization" of
Sino-American law enforcement efforts is imbalanced, leaving the evolution
of an MLAT doctrine incomplete.17  In particular, the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA
fails to account for the weakening of constitutional safeguards in U.S.
criminal proceedings resulting from such Sino-American cooperation. First,
defendants are barred from direct use of the MLAT,1 8 which forces them to
resort to the unpredictable letters rogatory approach.1 9  The right to
compulsory process of witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution may thus be compromised.2 °  Without recourse to the
streamlined MLAT procedure now reserved for prosecutors, the very
16 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
"? Harmonization is an evolution of international legal mechanisms that incorporates three
component processes: regularization of relations among law enforcement officials in day-to-day practice,
accommodation of central structural differences between sovereign systems through MLATs, and
homogenization of statutory schemes toward a common norm. NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 10-11. See
also discussion infra Part III.C.
ta Like many MLATs, the U.S.-P.R.C MLAA does not provide for use by "private persons" (i.e.
defendants). See discussion infra Part V.B.
I9 The letters rogatory process places a number of discretionary hurdles on the defendant by
requiring that formal requests be submitted through diplomatic channels to a foreign court, which, at its
discretion, may issue orders to the appropriate foreign authority to produce the requested evidence. See
ABBELL, supra note 15, § 3-3, at 6. See Part H.A infra for discussion of letters rogatory.
20 See discussion infra Part V.A.
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efficacy of an agreement with the P.R.C. exposes an imbalance between the
prosecution's and defendant's access to evidence abroad. Second, this
limited access to evidence heightens the defendant's need to adequately
confront U.S. government witnesses. If the P.R.C. authorities do not
transfer a witness to testify in a U.S. proceeding, the opportunity for defense
counsel to cross-examine a Chinese witness during a foreign deposition may
not comport with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The
threat of coercion in the P.R.C. criminal justice system, as exhibited in the
Wang case, may stifle truthfulness even if formal requirements for foreign
depositions are met under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
current applicable U.S. circuit court rulings.2' By allowing defendants in
U.S. criminal proceedings more reliable access to evidence in the P.R.C.
pursuant to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, the preservation of U.S. constitutional
rights to compulsory process and confrontation would be enhanced.2
II. THE NATURE AND THREAT OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
AFFECTING THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
In contemporary China, a resurgence of organized criminal activity
has accompanied the sweeping economic liberalization which has occurred
23
since the Deng era. The spectrum of Chinese organized crime groups
includes a mixture of traditional secret societies (known as "Triads") and
modem racketeers in open competition for market share.24 The Triads have
been based in Hong Kong since the nineteenth century, with a network
21 See discussion infra Part V.B.
22 This Comment focuses on U.S. criminal proceedings and the constitutional issues that arise therein
due to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA. It may be that it is problematic to provide evidence to Chinese prosecutors
when Chinese defendants enjoy no such analogous rights under the Chinese Constitution or Chinese
Criminal Procedure Law. See, e.g., JONATHON HECHT, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW, 60-64 (1996)
(arguing that Chinese trial standards do not meet international norms for fairness, including no presumption
of innocence, purported use of illegally gathered evidence, and no fixed burden of proof); William C.
Jones, The Constitution of the People's Republic Of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707 (1985) (positing that the
Chinese Constitution does not provide cognizable rights in the American sense, but is rather a document for
canvassing broad formulations of policy). The "rights" issue in Chinese law is subject to vastly differing
and contentious views. See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF
LAW, 533-46 (2002).
23 See KERRY, supra note 14, at 51-53. In 1978, Deng Xiaopeng initiated the program of economic
modernization. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO, 122-23
(1999).
24 See KERRY, supra note 14, at 52-53.
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25
among Chinese in the United States and other countries. Modem
racketeers like the "Big Circle" are often erstwhile members of the People's
Liberation Army and the Red Guards, and focus on the illicit arms trade,
26among other things. These groups are engaged in a wide range of criminal
activities that generate enormous revenues. 27  U.S. law enforcement and
criminologists identify the "Triads" as among the so-called "Big Five" of
ethnically based, transnational organized crime.28
According to experts, Triad societies in Hong Kong are purportedly
the best organized societies in the Chinese diaspora, 29 with Hong Kong
serving as the "capital" of their transnational criminal activities. 30  Hong
Kong smuggling enterprises coordinate import-export networks between
Southeast Asia, the P.R.C. and the United States. 3 1  Since the 1980s,
mainland Chinese organized criminal groups have increasingly flourished in
the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Yunnan, aided by
25 See generally KO-LIN CHIN, CHINATOWN GANGS: EXTORTION, ENTERPRISE, AND ETHNICITY 5-11
(1996); LYNN PAN, SONS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR: THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE DIASPORA, 338-56 (2d
ed. 1994). Triad societies have origins on the Chinese mainland that date back 2000 years. See generally
MARTIN BOOTH, THE DRAGON SYNDICATES: THE GLOBAL PHENOMENON OF THE TRIADS 4-8 (1999).
26 BOOTH, supra note 25, at 280-81. Big Circle can be further distinguished from traditional Triads
by the fact that they dispense with historical ritual and expand criminal activities beyond the confines of
overseas Chinese communities. Id. at 314.
27 Growth industries for Chinese criminal groups are alien smuggling (estimated more than $3.2
billion per year); trafficking in arms, stolen cars, boats and electronics (more than $7 billion); and drug
production and trade ($200 billion) in 1996. KERRY, supra note 14, at 53. The volume of heroin and
opium seizure has risen, respectively, from 2.376 and 1.1 metric tons in 1995 to 6.281 and 2.248 metric
tons in 2000. Methamphetamines have skyrocketed from 1.608 metric tons in 1998 to 20.9 metric tons in
2000. DEA Drug Intelligence Brief: China Country Brief as of March 2002, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02009/02009.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002). Other activities of the
Triads include illegal gambling, extortion, prostitution, loan-sharking, infiltrating legitimate businesses, and
real estate. They number as many as 160,000 members, belonging to fifty groups. See Problems and
Dangers Posed by Organized Transnational Crime in the Various Regions of the World, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 16 (Phil Williams & Ernesto U. Savona eds. 1996)
[hereinafter Problems and Dangers].
28 See KERRY, supra note 14, at 21. The so-called "Big Five" international criminal organizations
also include the Russian Mafiya, Japanese Yakuza, Italian Mafia, and Colombian cartels. See CarrieLyn
Donigan Guymon, International Legal Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organized Crime: The
Need for a Multilateral Convention, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1987). This ethnic categorization is
somewhat questionable given the emergent cooperative model of criminal enterprise. See generally Joseph
L. Albini, Donald Cressey s Contribution to the Study of Organized Crine: An Evaluation, in
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 16: A READER (Patrick J. Ryan & George E.
Rush eds., 1997). See also Ko-lin Chin, et. al., Transnational Chinese Organized Crime Activities:
Patterns and Emerging Trends, in COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: CONCEPTS, ACTIVITIES, AND
RESPONSES 127, 131 (Phil Williams & Dmitri Vlassis eds., 2001) (stating that Chinese heroin distribution
in New York is closely associated with Dominican criminal groups).
29 Chin et. al., supra note 28, at 128.
30 See PAN, supra note 25, at 338-40.
31 See John Dombrink & John Huey-Long Song, Hong Kong After 1997: Transnational Organized
Crime in a Shrinking World, in UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: A READER
214, 217 (Patrick J. Ryan & George E. Rush eds., 1997).
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financial support, practical experience and wider distribution links of Triad
groups from Hong Kong (and Taiwan and Macau).32 Apart from smuggling,
commentators suggest that major Triads, such as the Sun Yee On, have
relocated operations to the South Chinese mainland.33  As the Triads revive
criminal activity on the mainland, Hong Kong and other coastal cities serve
as trans-shipment points for Yunnan heroin, Chinese narcotic precursor
chemicals, and Fujian aliens bound for the United States and elsewhere.
34
The effects of transnational organized crime threaten the foundations
of national governments. 35  The rapid technological advances and scientific
innovations "that underlie the process of economic globalization" have
spurred a parallel global expansion and diversification of organized crime.
36
In some cases, organized crime represents a rival authority structure based
on a black market economy of substantial proportions.37  This "new
authoritarianism" spreads as organized crime usurps the state's
responsibilities, for example, in performing government social services.
38
This illegitimate power base could undermine democratic institutions and
individual rights as corruption and intimidation sap integrity from a nation's
judiciary, law enforcement, and the media.39
The security threat to more authoritarian governments, like the P.R.C.,
is no less acute. Triads have reestablished secret criminal societies on the
Chinese mainland by controlling prostitution, extortion rackets, and
trafficking in drugs, women, and aliens.40  An estimated 300 million
disaffected, socially mobile people lack fixed labor and form an ideal
32 Chin et. al., supra note 28, at 129-30.; McElroy, supra note 14, at 14.
33 See Fraser, supra note 14, at 3 ("Triad resurgence can be explained 'because they have the capital,
they have experience running entertainment businesses, drugs, and women, [and] can be of use to local
mainland criminal entrepreneurs."' (quoting criminologist Professor Chu Yiu-kong of University of Hong
Kong, Department of Sociology)).
34 See Dombrink & Song, supra note 31, at 217; KERRY, supra note 14, at 51-52. Experts estimate
that 50,000 Chinese are smuggled into the United States each year, and that the Chinese human trade yields
an estimated annual profit of three billion U.S. dollars. Cleo J. Kung, Supporting the Snakeheads: Human
Smuggling From China and the 1996 Amendment to the U.S. Statutory Definition of "Refugee," 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1271, 1273 (2000).
35 According to some analysts, "international organized crime is an assault on the three pillars of
state sovereignty: the control of borders, the monopoly on the use of violence for enforcement, and the
power to tax economic activity within state borders." Guymon, supra note 28, at 61.
36 Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL. 1, 8
(2000).
17 See Problems and Dangers, supra note 27, at 34.
'a See Louise I. Shelley, Transnational Organized Crime. The New Authoritarianism, in THE ILLICIT
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STATE POWER 25, 32 (H. Richard Friman & Peter Andreas eds., 1999).
39 See Rotinan, supra note 36, at 10.
40 See McElroy supra note 14, at 14. (citing Chinese MPS arrest figures: of the 247,000 arrested
during a six-month clampdown on prostitution, more than 5,000 detainees held senior positions in hei
shiwei (or "black societies")).
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criminal labor force.41 Internally, P.R.C. officials fear the proliferation of
secret Triad societies that co-opt displaced rural migrants to dynamic urban
centers like Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai.42  Chinese authorities claim
the number of Triads in the P.R.C. reaches upward of one million.43
Triad activity on the mainland is part of a mounting crime wave that
vexes P.R.C. officials.44  With frenetic economic activity, the drive for
profits has blurred the distinctions between business, crime, and
government 5 Triads exploit the economic liberalization and corrupt P.R.C.
officials to entrench criminal enterprises.4 6 The pervasiveness of corruption
in government agencies of the P.R.C. also illustrates the degree to which
Triad and other organized criminal activity undermines P.R.C. authority.47
For instance, the Public Security Bureau ("PSB"), the government entity
charged with fighting crime, is allegedly rife with graft and corruption.
The effect is to undermine Chinese sovereignty internally and circumvent
control of P.R.C. borders through illicit trade.49  As the McCaffrey
Announcement suggests, U.S. authorities view the expanding narcotics trade
in East Asia as a ready basis for joint law enforcement activities and judicial
cooperation pursuant to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA. 50  Aside from the topical
threat, if organized crime succeeds in unraveling state authority, deeper
concerns about P.R.C. stability and its international repercussions further
prompt U.S. strategies for mutual legal assistance with the P.R.C.5 1
4 BOOTH, supra note 25, at 324.
42 See McElroy, supra note 14, at 14.
41 Jobless Migrants Swell China's Triads, STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Oct. 27, 2000, at 20
[hereinafter Jobless Migrants]. See also BOOTH, supra note 25, at 326. ("Chinese criminologists estimate
that the number of organized-crime gang members in China escalated from 100,000 in 1986 to over
500,000 in 1994: the figure is now likely to be in the region of 1.5 million.").
44 See McElroy, supra note 14.
45 KERRY, supra note 14, at 51-52.
4 See Jobless Migrants, supra note 43.
47 See, e.g., DAVID M. LAMPTON, SAME BED, DIFFERENT DREAMS: MANAGING U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS 1989-2000 145 (2001); KERRY supra note 14, at 51 (noting threat of pervasive corruption in the
P.R4Q. James J. McKenna, Organized Crime in the Former Royal Colony of Hong Kong, in
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZED CRIME IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: A READER 205, 213 (Patrick J. Ryan &
George E. Rush eds., 1997).
49 LAMPTON, supra note 47, at 145 (pointing to President Jiang Zemin's decision to form of an anti-
smugfling police force to stymie endemic corruption among P.R.C. customs and immigration officials).
McCaffrey Announcement, supra note 1.
s1 See KERRY, supra note 14, at 69.
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III. BILATERAL MuTuAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES AS TOOLS IN
COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
In the last thirty years, MLATs have emerged as mechanisms to
streamline international judicial assistance to combat transnational organized
crime. 52 With greater frequency, U.S. authorities apply these agreements as
prosecutorial tools to enhance the inter-jurisdictional exchange of physical
evidence and facilitation of witness testimony among signatories. 53 The
direct exchange between prosecutors is far superior to the antiquated letters
rogatory approach that involved discretionary orders by foreign courts
pursuant to each request for production of evidence.5 4 Each successive
MLAT is adapted to overcome particular obstacles of sovereignty among
signatory countries.55 The overall effect, moreover, is that international law
enforcement increasingly reflects U.S. policy interests to such a degree that
some commentators have described this evolution as an "Americanization"
of international law enforcement, 56 even if U.S. constitutional protections
have not necessarily followed in tow.
57
A. Letters Rogatory: The Inefficient Predecessor to Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties
Prior to the advent of MLATs, U.S. prosecutors resorted to letters
rogatory as the principal method for obtaining evidence abroad. 8 Under the
basic principles of international law, a sovereign state is not obligated to
produce persons, physical evidence, or documents as evidence for
proceedings in another national jurisdiction. 59  This time-consuming,
52 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 315. While civil law countries had concluded treaties with respect
to judicial assistance in criminal matters as early as the 1820's, "the United States did not become
interested in such treaties until the late 1940's and early 1960's." See Bruce Zagaris & Jessica Resnick,
The Mexico-US Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty: Another Step Toward The
Harmonization of International Law Enforcement, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 5 (1997).
"' The United States currently has operative MLATs with over fifty countries. See ABBELL, supra
note 15, app. C, at A-45.
54 Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 206-07.
55 See Mark K. Gyandoh, Notes and Comments, Foreign Evidence Gathering. What Obstacles Stand
In the Way of Justice?, 15 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 81, 90 (2001).
56 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 470, 475-76 (noting fusion of law enforcement and national
securig concerns).
5 See discussion infra Part V.
58 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 318-19.
59 Among the principles inherent in national sovereignty are exclusivity and non-intervention. The
courts of a sovereign state have exclusive jurisdiction over matters within the borders of that state and they
have a duty not to intervene in the affairs of other sovereign states. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (5th ed. 1998). While organized crime has accompanied economic
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circuitous process requires that formal requests be submitted through
diplomatic channels to foreign courts, which issue orders to the foreign
"Appropriate Authority" to produce the requested evidence. 60  The foreign
authority in turn transmits the requested evidence back through the same
channels. 61 This process is generally unreliable due to the vast differences in
processing procedures and the wide variation on the limits set by national
law defining what may be requested through this process. 62
Despite some limited ad hoc procedural innovations, coordinated
bilateral prosecutions outside the MLAT context remain hampered by the
necessity of letters rogatory.64 Nonetheless, this antiquated system remains
the primary method for criminal defendants seeking exculpatory evidence
abroad.65
B. Definition and Legal Framework of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
An MLAT is a bilateral agreement between two countries in which
66the parties agree to provide assistance in certain prosecutorial procedures.
Typical MLAT provisions include execution of requests regarding search
warrants; taking testimony or statements; document production; service of
writs, summonses, or other judicial orders; locating persons; and providing
judicial records, evidence, and information.67 These agreements are binding
and also provide for assistance in related civil or administrative
proceedings.6 8 Under an MLAT, the parties establish a central authority in
each state to oversee compliance with its terms. 69 In the United States, the
globalization in innovation, diversification and transnational reach, law enforcement has been traditionally
limited by the confines of sovereignty and national jurisdiction. NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 5-7.
60 See ABBELL, supra note 15 §3-3, at 6. The transmittal of letters rogatory to and from the United
States is regulated by 28 U.S.C. §1781. See ABBELL, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 1.
61 Id. §3-3, at 6.
62 See Peter J. Vassalo, Note, The New Ivan the Terrible: Problems in International Criminal
Enforcement and the Specter of the Russian Mafia, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 173, 189 (1996).
63 The 1970 Amendments to Rule 15 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946) (permitting
federal prosecutors, as a hearsay exception in organized crime cases, to take depositions from witnesses
abroad who were unable or unwilling to appear in U.S. court); The 1975 Amendments of Rule 15 of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1946) (extending the hearsay exception to all federal criminal cases).
See NADELMANN, supra note 11, at 324.
64 See ABBELL, supra note 15, §3-9, at 12.
65 See discussion infra Part V.A.
66 See Abramovsky, supra note 13, at 207 (stating that MLATs are the most comprehensive of all
international evidence-gathering processes).
67 See Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barracading the Nuclear Window: A Legal Regime to
Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 667, 727 (1996).
6s See James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (1988).
69 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 342 (discussing the U.S.-Switzerland MLAT).
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Office of International Affairs ("OIA") functions as the Central Authority
within the U.S. DOJ to coordinate international law enforcement concerns
and to process MLAT requests.7v
The general purpose of an MLAT is to overcome entrenched
jurisdictional obstacles and foreign procedures that render evidence, such as
depositions and authenticated documents, inadmissible in U.S. courts.7'
MLATs first identify specific areas in which there is a need for bilateral
cooperation, and then create legal frameworks to facilitate the exchange of
relevant evidence and information.72 In contrast to letters rogatory, a mutual
assistance treaty in criminal matters obligates each party to render assistance
pursuant to the terms of the treaty.73 The state from which mutual legal
assistance is requested usually does not conduct procedures such as deposing
witnesses-it only supports the foreign criminal procedure conducted by the
requesting state.74 As a result, MLATs lead signatories to surrender a
certain degree of sovereignty and to allow some foreign intrusion into
traditionally domestic areas of crime control.75
It is important to note, however, that "political offense' 76 and "human
rights ' '77 exception clauses are often drafted into MLATs as specific grounds
for denying assistance, especially with non-democratic governments.
7 8
These exception clauses permit the requested country to deny assistance
when it is wary that the requesting country seeks to misuse its judicial
system to punish or harass political opponents.7 9 The generic formulation of
"political offense" non-applicability grounds derives from the U.S.-
70 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 105-22, at 4 (1998) (providing technical analysis of MLAT with Brazil,
Czech Republic, Hong Kong, and other bilateral partners).71 See NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 327 (stating U.S. treaty negotiators' objectives with
Switzerland in 1977 served as a model for future MLATs).
72 See Vassalo, supra note 62, at 188-89 (noting that a request is processed more quickly because the
requesting state must only contact the representative of the requested state specified in the treaty, which
eliminates the role of the courts).
71 See ABBELL, supra note 15, §4-3, at 4.
74 See Eugene Solomonov, Comment, US.-Russian Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty: Is There a Way
to Control Russian Organized Crime?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 165, 200 (1999).
" See Vassalo, supra note 62, at 188 (stating that provisions in the MLAT between United States
and Switzerland take precedence over all national laws).
76 See, e.g., U.S.-France MLAT, art. Vl(l)(a), reprinted in ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D., at A-
139; U.S.- Jamaica, MLAT, art. II(1)(b), reprinted in ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D, at A-190.
77 See, e.g., Bilateral Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Bahamas on the Control of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (entered
into force Feb. 17, 1989), art. 1(3), reprinted in ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D., at A-87 [hereinafter U.S.-
Bahamas MLAT].
78 See ABBELL, supra note 15, §4-5, at 39; NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 351-52.
79 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 351.
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Switzerland MLAT.80  Every MLAT reserves discretion to deny requests if
assistance would prejudice a signatory's sovereignty, security or other public
interest.
81
C. The Evolving Harmonization of International Law Enforcement
Through the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
The United States currently has MLATs with many countries where
significant criminal organizations operate. 82 Each MLAT serves two main
purposes. First, through mutual assistance, the signatories bolster certain
types of criminal prosecutions. 83  Second, an MLAT reconciles two
disparate sovereign systems in a consistent framework that transcends the
immediate stated objective of the agreement (such as immobilizing narcotics
trafficking).8 4 Each MLAT thus evinces U.S. motivations particular to
foreign policy considerations concerning the treaty partner.8 5  The
cumulative result of this treaty-making is the internationalization of U.S. law
enforcement with diminishing legal impediments to its reach.86 According
to Professor Ethan Nadelmann of Princeton University, a noted scholar of
the internationalization of U.S. law enforcement, "MLATs, with their
emphasis on reconciling the needs, procedures, and customs of different
legal systems, epitomize the notion of accommodation."87 While the fifty or
more agreements on mutual legal assistance offer myriad examples of this
80 See Agreement Between the United States and Switzerland Relating to the Treaty of May 25,
1973, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977), art. I1(l)(c)(1),
reprinted in ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D, at A-264 [hereinafter U.S.- Switzerland MLAT] (stating the
grounds for non-applicability of treaty obligations "concerning an offense which the requested state
considers a political offense or an offense connected with a political offense").
91 ABBELL, supra note 15, §4-5, at 37.
12 These countries include: The Bahamas, Canada, Colombia, Hong Kong, Italy, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (including the Cayman Ilands), Russia, among others. For
a comlete list as of Jan. 2002, see id app. C, at A-45-46.
NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 345 (citing emphasis in U.S. MLATs with Colombia and The
Netherlands on immobilization of drug trafficking in the Caribbean).
84 For example, in the MLAT with Italy, the United States expanded its subpoena power and
innovated a type of cooperation to include the sharing of forfeiture assets. See Treaty with Italian Republic
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, with Memorandum of Understanding, Nov. 9, 1982 (entered
into force Nov. 13, 1985), art. I, reprinted in ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D, at A-177 [hereinafter MLAT
U.S.-Italy]. See NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 353-54.
85 See Gyandoh, supra note 55, at 90.
86 Indeed, this is Nadelmann's larger thesis: U.S. law enforcement seeks to operate internationally
free of the confines of national sovereignty. NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 477. The MLAT functions to
extend this U.S. reach piecemeal, organically stitching together jurisdictions in enforceable bilateral
treaties. Cf Guyrnon, supra note 28, at 83, 99 (arguing that MLATs' effectiveness is limited without
concurrent international convention against transnational organized crime).
" Id. at 316-17.
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gradual accommodation, a few landmark treaties stand out for their
illustrative utility.
The MLAT's circumvention of bank secrecy laws is a prime example
of this accommodation. 88  The U.S.-Switzerland MLAT removed legal
obstacles to permit disclosure of banking records of Sicilian organized crime
figures who attempted to take advantage of stringent Swiss financial privacy
laws to shelter ill-gotten gambling proceeds. 89  The treaty reconciled the
demands of both nations by limiting the scope of assistance to offenses
involving gambling or organized crime. 90 Similar MLAT provisions with
the Cayman Islands, Bahamas, and Canada focused on the objectives of U.S.
Attorneys to access illicit drug proceeds sheltered in British Caribbean tax
havens under stiff bank secrecy laws.9' The scope of the U.S.-Cayman
treaty was eventually expanded to include requests in drug-related cases and
offenses such as insider trading.92 In addition, these treaties functioned to
rein in U.S. attorneys who increasingly resorted to unilateral measures to
obtain financial information about narcotics traffickers.93 Accommodation
in these instances served both to expand the reach of U.S. prosecutors and to
limit the manner of extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction.
The accretion of MLATs in the last thirty years has created a growing
web of bilateral agreements that link sovereign jurisdictions, gaps that were
previously bridged with difficulty under the ineffective letters rogatory
system.94 The United States in particular has allocated enormous resources
to support aggressive international policing.95  Nadelmann argues that
"harmonization" is an evolution of international legal mechanisms that
incorporates three processes: regularization of relations among law
88 See generally Elliot A. Stultz, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the United States Efforts to Obtain
Information from Swiss Banks, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81-104 (1988).
See Zagaris & Resnick, supra note 52, at 5. In Switzerland, tax evasion and customs violations
are far less serious. Lionel Frei & Stefan Treschel, Origins and Applications of the United States-
Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 31 HARVARD INT'L L.J. 77, 79 (1990).
90 Id. at 83.
91 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 357, 368-69.
12 Id. at 363.
93 Id. at 360-61. As local courts were often reluctant to issue orders of disclosure in response to U.S.
letters rogatory, U.S. prosecutors asserted jurisdiction in the form of subpeonas duces tecum on banks with
subsidiaries in the United States to produce documents from off-shore banks. Id at 361. These unilateral
measures, eventually known as Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas, rankled British, Canadian, Bahamanian,
and Caymanian authorities because compliance risked violation of the Caymanian Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) Law. See Gyandoh, supra note 55, at 95-97. See also United States v. Bank
ofNova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (upholding the legality
of subpoenas and a fine for failure to comply served on a Miami branch of a Canadian bank to produce
documents from a Bahamanian branch).
NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 394-96.
9' Id. at 472-73, 475-76 (noting an increasing convergence between U.S. international enforcement
and foreign policy interests).
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enforcement officials in day-to-day practice, accommodation of central
structural differences between sovereign systems through MLATs, and
96homogenization of statutory schemes toward a common norm. He further
contends this process is increasingly synonymous with "Americanization" of
international law enforcement,97 as cooperation generally reflects American
interests in substance and procedure. 98  For instance, joint prosecutions
disproportionately target narcotics-related offenses in the U.S. "war on
drugs," while MLATs ensure that evidence meets strict U.S. admissibility
standards. 99 In spite of this so-called "Americanization," critics of MLATs
point to deficiencies in this framework that diminish criminal defendants'
constitutional rights, 100 which are inherent in the U.S. legal system.
IV. THE SUBSTANCE AND SCOPE OF U.S-P.R.C. AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The McCaffrey Announcement emphasized drug trafficking and
associated criminality as the focal point of the mutual legal assistance
envisioned by U.S. authorities.1 '' The United States and the P.R.C.
designated the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") as the
respective central authorities charged with processing requests for
assistance. 10 2 The scope of application of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA includes:
serving documents; taking the testimony or statements of persons; providing
originals, certified copies, records or articles of evidence; obtaining and
96 id.
'7 Id. at 470.
98 Id. at 471. See discussion infra Part V.C.
99 Id. at 314, 317.
1o See, e.g., Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Note, The Unavoidable Correlative: Extraterritorial Power
and the United States Constitution, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 147 (1999) (advocating the extension of
Fourth Amendment protections to people outside U.S. territory who are victims of illegal searches and
seizures by U.S. law enforcement acting independently or in concert with host country); Diane Marie
Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in an International Context,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1201 (1998) (advocating the extension of the privilege against self-discrimination in the
international context to grant foreign witnesses immunity under the Fifth Amendment where fear of foreign
prosecution is asserted due to statements made in U.S. courts); Micheal Abbell, DOJ Renews Assault on
Defendants' Right to Use Treaties to Obtain Evidence from Abroad, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 20, 21
(arguing that MLATs should expressly permit defendants access to evidence abroad to avoid compromising
their Sixth Amendment rights). See also discussion infra Part V.C.
1o1 See McCaffrey Announcement, supra note 1. As of December 1, 2002, requests for evidence have
been limited to witness statements and banking records. E-mail correspondence from Harry Marshall,
negotiator of U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, to David
Whedbee, Comment Author, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (Dec. 1, 2002) (on file with the author)
(hereinafter Marshall Correspondence].
i"2 U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. II. The Chinese Central Authority is the Ministry of
Justice. See McCaffrey Announcement supra note 1.
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providing expert evaluations; making persons available to give evidence or
assist in investigations; locating or identifying persons; executing requests
for inquiry, and searches; freezing and seizure of evidence; assisting in
forfeiture proceeding; transferring persons in custody for giving testimony or
assisting in investigations; and any other form of assistance not contrary to
the laws of the requested party.10 3 The Agreement's obligations expressly
exclude "a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress, or
exclude any evidence." This provision bars criminal defendants access to
the streamlined evidence-gathering capacity afforded the prosecution.'05
Article 3 of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA sets forth the limitations on
assistance. 1°6  In subsection l(a), the parties did not adopt the dual
criminality requirement that the offense for which assistance was requested
must correspond to the same or similar offense under the criminal laws of
the requested party. 10 7  This discretionary approach allows for more
flexibility in coordinating prosecution of criminal activity that might not be
codified in the P.R.C.10s Subsection l(b) provides for exceptions for a
"purely military offense."' 1 9  In subsection 1(c), the broad discretionary
exception category designates that requests may be denied that "would
prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order (ordre publique), important
public policy or other essential interests of the Request Party."' 10 Article 3
also provides that the requested party may deny assistance if "the execution
of the request would be contrary to the Constitution of the Requested
Party,""' or if the "assistance requested lacks substantial connection with
the case."
'
"
12
As a further limitation on assistance, an expansive political offense
exception is included under Article 3(l)(c)." 3  In contrast to a generic
103 See U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. I(1); (2)(a-j).
104 Id. art. 1(3).
105 See discussion infra Part V.A.
:06 See generally U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. II.
" Id. art. III(l)(a). Dual criminality requires that the evidence exchanged under an MLAT pertain to
an offense which contains similar elements in each signatory country. See Frei & Treschel, supra note 89,
at 84-85. (discussing dual criminality requirement in the U.S.-Switzerland MLAT).
"' U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. IlI(1)(a) (stating that parties "may agree to provide
assistance for a particular offense, or category of offenses, irrespective of whether the conduct would
constitute an offense under the laws in the territory of both Parties").
509 Id. art. III(l)(b).
'I Id. art. Ill(l)(c).
... Id. art. 111(e).
:1 Id. art. III(g).
1 Id. art. III(l)(c). See also Marshall Correspondence, supra note 101 (noting expansion of
exception in U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA).
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exception clause, 114 the scope of this exception in the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA is
greater in specificity:
I s
[T]he Requested Party may deny assistance if ... the request
relates to a political offense or the request is politically
motivated or there is substantial grounds for believing that the
request was made for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting,
punishing, or otherwise proceeding against a person on account
of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions." 
6
The expanded political offense exception marks a significant response to the
Chinese criminal justice system, widely decried for its record of human
rights abuses and prosecution of political crimes."17
The adoption of the P.R.C. 1997 Criminal Law ("CL") formally
aimed to depoliticize Chinese criminal law," 8 which was the target of much
human rights criticism. 1 9 However, commentators regard this reform as
largely a superficial shift in rhetoric rather than an elimination of politically
motivated prosecutions. 20  Pursuant to Article 3(1)(d) of the U.S.-P.R.C.
114 The generic "political offense" clause has been regularly included as an exception in the
framework for judicial assistance, especially with non-democratic governments. See NADELMANN, supra
note 12, at 351-52. This generic formulation of "political offense" non-applicability grounds derives from
the U.S.-Switzerland MLAT. See U.S.-Switzerland MLAT, supra note 80, art. l1(l)(c)(1) reprinted in
ABBELL, supra note 15, app. D, at A-264 (stating the grounds for non-applicability of treaty obligations
"concerning an offense which the requested state considers a political offense or an offense connected with
a political offense").
"5 Mr. Marshall did not elaborate on U.S. negotiators' motivations, except to note that the political
offense clause contained more detailed language than standard clauses. See Marshall Correspondence,
supra note 101. It should be noted that this expanded clause is consistent with the U.S.-Hong Kong
MLAT. Cf Agreement with Hong Kong on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, With Annex,
Apr. 15, 1997, U.S.-Hong Kong, art. IlI(l)(c) S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-6 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.-Hong
Kong MLAT].
16 U.S.-P.R.C MLAA, supra note 1, art. III(l)(d).
117 See, e.g., DONALD C. CLARKE, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WRONGS AND
RIGHTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S REVISED CRIMINAL LAW, 67 (1998); Ian Dobinson, The
Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China (1997): Real Change or Rhetoric?, PAC. RIM L. & POL. J.
1, 44-51 (2001).
"' See Criminal Law of the People's Republic Of China (amended 2nd Sess. of the 8th National
People's Congress on March 14, 1997), art. 1, translated in WEI Luo, AMENDED CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION, AND ANNOTATION 33 (1998) and the
1997 version of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic Of China, art.I (removing Marxist-Leninist
language as the basis for the 1997 Criminal Law, and stating that the law "is formulated ... in the struggle
against crime, in order to punish crime and protect people"). See id. at 13-16 [hereinafter CL].
19 See CLARKE, supra note 117, at 42-46.
2o See Dobinson, supra note 117, at 59-62; CLARKE, supra note 117 at 44-46. Under Article 2 of the
1979 Criminal Law, the objective of Chinese criminal law was to "fight against all counterrevolutionary
acts in order to defend the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Dobinson, supra note 117, at 24
(citing Article 2 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (1979)). Nevertheless, the
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MLAA, U.S. Central Authority can pierce the superficial changes in the
language of the Chinese CL and identify underlying substantive political
offenses as the objective of Chinese prosecutions. In practical terms, Article
3(d) allows U.S. authorities to withhold evidence that might assist in the
prosecution of political dissidents or ethnic minorities. The language of
Article 3(d) is symbolically significant, too, as it adopts language directly
from the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which serves as the basis for political asylum in many countries, including
the United States.
121
The flexibility of the United States to limit assistance on these
grounds is necessary because the Chinese procuratorate can prosecute "cult
groups" like the Falun Gong as readily as any Triad group under the CL.
For instance, Article 300(1) of the CL outlaws secret societies which are
organized or used for gain.1 22  Interestingly, when the CL was adopted in
1997, the Falun Gong had not attained national notoriety as a "cult
group." 123  The language of the Article 300, subsections (2) and (3) of the
CL, prohibits deception through superstitious or secret societies to "cheat,"
"have sexual relations with a woman" or "swindle property," yet these
criminal provisions could just as well be aimed at Triad rackets in large
mainland cities. 124  In light of the loosening ideological cogency of the
Chinese Communist Party, 12 5 it is not surprising that P.R.C. authorities
would be equally concerned about the powerful draw of Falun Gong or
Triad brotherhoods. 126  Inasmuch as the Supreme People's Court ("SPC")
criminalized "[c]ollaborating with overseas groups, organizations, and
individuals for sect-related activities,) 127 the U.S. OIA may withhold
substance of these reclassified offenses remains virtually the same. Id. at 26 (citing Article 103 of the CL,
which makes it a crime to "organize, plot, or act to split the country or undermine national unification").
121 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S., art. I (A)(2). For
similar language in U.S. asylum law, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 209(b)(1) (2002) ("Immigration and
Nationality Act").
122 "Anyone who organizes or utilizes a superstitious sect, secret society or cult, or takes advantage of
some people's superstitions to undermine the implementation of national law shall be sentenced [from three
to seven years]." CL, supra note 118, art. 300(1) at 161.
123 In October 1999, the Chinese authorities applied Article 300 of the CL after large demonstrations
had been staged by the Falun Gong in Beijing. See Dobinson, supra note 117, at 44-45 (citing as an
interpretation of Article 300, the National People's Congress Standing Committee's Decision Regarding
Outlawing Cult Organizations and Punishing Cult Activities [hereinafter Decision Regarding Cults]).
124 See Fraser, supra note 14 (documenting rise of Triad "secret societies" in mainland cities). It is
worth recalling that until the demise of the Q'ing dynasty in 1911, Triad societies fused a rich mythology,
religious symbolism, and criminal activity into an alluring opposition to imperial rule. See BOOTH, supra
note 25, at 13-14, 19-21.
125 See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 22, at 172 (citing waning ideological persuasiveness of
socialism); LUBMAN, supra note 23, at 171 (discussing the ideological vacuum in the P.R.C.).
126 See Fraser, supra note 14.
127 Dobinson, supra note 117, at 45 (quoting Decision Regarding Cults).
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assistance for any prosecution of groups like the Falun Gong, while assisting
prosecution efforts of Triad transnational criminal activity.
The U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA also contains provisions covering the manner
in which evidence may be obtained in the requested country. Such
provisions include the availability of witnesses to assist investigations and/or
testify in the requesting country, and the transfer of witnesses to the
requesting country. 128 Article 9 covers the obligations to take evidence in
the requested country. 129 Article 9(1) requires that the requested country
compel a witness "to appear or produce evidence, including documents,
records, or articles."' 130 Such a person subpoenaed may "pose questions and
make a verbatim transcript" in a manner "not contrary to the laws in the
territory of the Requested country."''3 Written statements or depositions are
to be transmitted in a form admissible in the requesting country. 132 Most
significant, if the witness called pursuant to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA asserts
any claim of "immunity, incapacity, or privilege under the laws of the
[requesting country], the [taking of evidence] shall not be impeded,"' 33 and
the claim "shall be made known to the Central Authority of the Requesting
Party for resolution by the authorities of that Party."' 34 This clause suggests
that the courts of the requesting country might be required to adjudicate a
claim of immunity or a privilege against self-incrimination in regard to
certain testimony while the remainder of the testimony would proceed
unimpeded.
Article 14 provides for execution of requests, "insofar as national law
permits . . . for inquiry, search, freezing, and seizure of evidentiary
materials."' 35 If necessary, terms and conditions may be imposed to protect
the interests of third parties. 36 Finally, Article 16 allows for discretionary
assistance in forfeiture proceedings whereby the parties may inform their
"' See e.g., U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. IX ("Taking Evidence in the Requested Party");
art. XI ("Availability of Persons to Give Evidence or Assist in Investigation in the Territory of the
Requesting Country"); art. XII ("Transfer of Persons in Custody for Giving Evidence or Assisting in
Investigation").
12I d. art. IX.
13I Id. art. IX(I) ("A person [in the requested country) shall be compelled, if necessary or in
conformity [with the MLAA], to appear and testify or produce evidence, including documents, records, or
articles"). It should be noted that the signatory countries do not adopt the so-called "international
subpoena" compelling testimony in the requesting country. Cf id. art XII(2) (requiring consent of witness
before transfer to the requesting country to testify).
131 Id. art. IX(3).
132 Id. art. IX(5).
3 Id. art IX(4).
U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. IX(4).
I3' d. art. XIV(1).
136 Id. art. XIV(4).
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respective Central Authorities if either becomes aware of "proceeds or
instrumentalities ... that may be forfeitable" for determination whether an
action is appropriate.1
37
The U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA furnishes the procedural mechanisms to
streamline the exchange of evidence and witnesses between the two
sovereign nations. Expanded evidence-gathering capacity is appropriate and
necessary to coordinate Sino-American prosecutions in combating crime that
by definition extends beyond sovereign borders. The flexibility in limiting
assistance, moreover, exerts effective instrumentalist pressure against
continuing to prosecute such political offenses. By engaging the P.R.C. in
the realm of judicial assistance, the MLAA can curb criminalization of
"political offenses" in the P.R.C. by demonstrably withholding cooperation.
Instead of decrying Chinese abuses from the outside, the MLAA procedural
framework regularizes the content of criminality between the two nations to
exclude political offenses. Under Nadelmann's rubric, the exception works
as an inverse of accommodation. 138 Through the U.S.-P.R.C.-MLAA, the
U.S. government can invoke this exception as a pragmatic barrier to
cooperation rather than mere moral condemnations of human rights abuses.
V. IMBALANCE UNDER THE U.S-P.R.C. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENT
Under Nadelmann's rubric, the MLAT functions to accommodate two
sovereign legal systems. 39 When comparing the criminal justice systems of
the United States and P.R.C., the historical and practical disparity of
underlying social values is vast and problematic. 140 Despite reforms adopted
in the People's Republic of China 1996 Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL")1
41
and People's Republic of China 1997 Criminal Law, 142 the Chinese
government and Chinese Communist Party have only tentatively recognized
"' Id. art. XVI.
138 See discussion supra Part III.B.
139 NADELMANN. supra note 12, at 316-17.
140 The United States maintains an adversarial system that emphasizes lmited government intrusion
and protection of individual rights. See Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and
Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 421 (1994). The
P.R.C., on the other hand, historically adopted a strictly penal approach to criminal law, devoid of "rights"
as understood in its dense Western political and jurisprudential meaning. See generally THOMAS B.
STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA (1992).
"'1 Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic Of China (adopted 4th Sess. of the 8th National
People's Congress on March 17, 1996, effective as of Jan. 1, 1997), translated in WEI Luo, AMENDED
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION,
AND ANNOTATION, 27-124 (2000) [hereinafter CPL].
142 CL, supra note 118, at 23-226.
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the rights of criminal suspects against the interests of the state. 4 3  In regard
to evidence-gathering, Chinese procuratorates have unfettered access to
evidence, while defendants have no independent subpoena power and are
subject to discretionary obstacles in accessing evidence and witnesses,
especially in cases involving broadly defined "state secrets.' 44
The Sino-American relationship through the U.S-P.R.C. MLAA
replicates this disparity, raising serious constitutional questions for
defendants in U.S. criminal proceedings. In particular, the U.S-P.R.C.
MLAA dramatizes the imbalance between the prosecutors' monopoly on the
use of the streamlined mechanism ready access to evidence abroad, and the
unreliable letters rogatory reserved for defendants. 145  The difference in
evidence-gathering capacity means that U.S. prosecutors have quick and
extensive access to evidence in the P.R.C. while defendants have no way of
compelling the MPS to produce exculpatory evidence. As defendants
attempt to gather evidence in the P.R.C., this unevenness skews the U.S. trial
in favor of the prosecution, infringing on criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights of compulsory process. 146 The defendant's limited access
to foreign evidence, in turn, increases the need to confront U.S. government
witnesses. In light of widely reported practice of coercion in the P.R.C.,14 7 a
defendant in a U.S. proceeding may not be able to adequately cross-examine
143 The CPL reshaped procedures to introduce more substantive elements of an adversarial system
regarding to arrest and detention, defense counsel, initiation of prosecution, and trial proceedings. See
HECHT, supra note 22, at 77. For many commentators, this reform remains questionable in light of
international and American rights-based standards. See CLARKE, supra note 117, at 65-67 (1998). But cf.
R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese
Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 36-38, 57 (1993) (arguing that human rights advocates in the
West should not impose notions of human rights developed from the same epistemology underlying the
history of liberal democracy founded on individual rights). It should be emphasized that U.S. constitutional
protections for criminal defendants did not dramatically expand until the Warren era of the 1960s. See
Magulis-Ohnuma, supra note 100, at 151. The purpose of presenting Chinese criminal law and procedure
in such a critical light is not to duplicate a human rights critique of the system available elsewhere. E.g.,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, (R. Randall Edwards, ed. 1986). Critical treatment is included
here to demonstrate potential problems, which necessarily come into play due to the obligations under the
U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, when judicial cooperation with such a criminal justice system as the P.R.C.'s is
squared with the high standards of the U.S. Constitution.
I" See discussion infra Part V.A. Article 9 of the CPL Implementation Provisions defines state
secrets as "cases whose details or nature involves state secrets." Provisions Concerning Several Issue in the
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law (promulgated Jan. 19, 1998 by the Supreme People's Court,
Supreme People's Procuratorate, Public Security Ministry, State Security Ministry, Justice Ministry, and
Legal System Working Committee of the National People's Congress Standing Committee) (1998) (P.R.C.)
art. 9, translated in LUO, supra note 141, at 133 [hereinafter CPL Implementation Provisions].
145 As noted, the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA expressly bars defendants from requesting evidence through the
streamlined MLAA procedure. See U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. 1 (3).
146 See discussion infra Part V.A.
147 See Wang v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
1996).
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a witness in Chinese custody, as is guaranteed under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.1 48  The threat of coercion may stifle
truthfulness 149 even if formal requirements for taking foreign depositions are
met under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and current applicable
doctrine among the U.S. circuit courts.
50
A. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment
The unreliability of the letters rogatory process and the difficulty of
procuring Chinese witnesses in U.S. court to testify in favor of the defendant
is problematic under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor[.]" 151  In cases
within U.S. territory, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this right in
order to strike down a state's application of its evidence rules that impair the
criminal defendant's capacity to present witnesses.152  This right to
compulsory process is limited, however, to the extent that it is "within the
power of the federal government to provide it.' 153 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has not passed on the core constitutional issue in the MLAT
context, 154 in rare instances, federal courts have invoked their supervisory
powers to order the DOJ to obtain evidence on behalf of defendants through
MLAT procedural channels under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure ("Rule 15"). 155
In United States v. Sindona, a federal district court directed the DOJ to
request evidence on a defendant's behalf pursuant to the U.S.-Switzerland
MLAT, which was silent on rights of "private persons," under threat that the
548 See discussion infra Part V.B.
" E.g., Wang, 837 F. Supp. at 1512-14.
"0 See discussion infra Section V.B.2.
"5 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
152 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973) (striking down state hearsay
exception for statements against interest that permitted statements against pecuniary interest, but barred
statements against penal interest); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967) (invalidating state evidence
rule that disqualified accomplices as witnesses for defense, but not for the prosecution). See generally
Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978).
153 United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251, (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 39 U.S. 820 (1962).
154 See ABBELL, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 4. But see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1972)
(relying on defunct federal law that did not permit state courts to compel witnesses from abroad).
"' See ABBELL, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 5. In exceptional circumstances, a court can require that
testimony of a prospective witness be taken and preserved for use at trial under FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 ("Rule
15"). See United States v. Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. 364, 372 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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case would be dismissed with prejudice if the government refused.'56
Similarly, in United States v. Des Marteau, once the court signaled its intent
to issue a Rule 15 order, the DOJ volunteered the use of the U.S.-Canadian
MLAT to take testimony of witnesses abroad pursuant to the defendant's
motion.15 7  According to Micheal Abbell, a prominent criminal defense
attorney and former head of the OA, "if the DOJ were to refuse to use an
MLAT to execute a Rule 15 court order authorizing a defendant to obtain
evidence from abroad, that denial would appear to violate the defendant's
rights under the Compulsory Process clause of the Sixth Amendment."'1 58
The Sindona and Des Marteau courts skirted the direct constitutional
issue and instead required U.S. prosecutors to obtain evidence on the
defendants' behalf pursuant to Rule 15 through the MLAT procedural
channels.1 59 While these courts compelled the DOJ to afford criminal
defendants fundamental fairness under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
invocation of federal supervisory power was entirely discretionary.160 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has offered only that "nothing in
[MLATs] is intended to negate the authority to ask the prosecution to make
requests for information under [MLATs].,, 161 The Senate, therefore, has not
further questioned defendants' limited access to evidence through MLATs.
The options available to the defendant in the Chinese context are: (1)
to petition the trial court with a Rule 15 motion to direct the DOJ to request
depositions of a Chinese witnesses or the production of physical evidence; or
(2) to seek directly through letters rogatory the evidence from the P.R.C.
Ministry of Justice ("MOJ"). 162  In both cases, the defendant faces dual
hurdles in obtaining exculpatory evidence. First, absent an MLAA provision
for a defendant's affirmative right to request evidence necessary for his
"' See In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting the US-Switzerland MLAT was
silent on the rights of "private persons"). See also United States v. Filippi, 918 F.2d 244, 246-48 (1st Cir.
1990) (upholding the trial court's authority to order the U.S. Attorney to request Special Interest Parole
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a Filipino witness for purposes of testifying for a
defendant).
'" Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. at 370-72.
s Abbell, supra note 100, at 22.
191 See ABBELL, supra note 14, § 2-2, at 5. Upon a motion by the government or defendant, in
exceptional circumstances, the court, under FED. R. CRIM. P. 15, can require testimony of a prospective
witness to be taken and preserved for use at trial. See Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. at 372 n.5.160 See, e.g., Sindona, 636 F.2d at 802; Filippi, 918 F.2d at 247. See also ABBELL, supra note 14, § 2-
2, at 5.
161 S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, at 5 (1989).
62 See Supreme People's Court Interpretations Concerning Several Issues in the Implementation of
the Chinese Procedure Law of the People's Republic (promulgated by the Supreme People's Court of the
People's Republic of China) Legal Interpretation No. 23, art. 325-336 [1998] ("Procedures for
Adjudicating Criminal Cases Involving Foreign Elements"), translated in Luo, supra note 141, at 245-249
[hereinafter SPC Interpretations]. See also CPL, supra note 141, art. 17 n.27, at 46.
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defense, discretionary DOJ requests to obtain evidence on behalf of the
defendant are insufficient to consistently vouchsafe compulsory process
rights. Indeed, de facto recognition of compulsory process rights pursuant to
Rule 15 orders are expressly contrary to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA's scope
excluding "private persons."'
63
A second, more significant hurdle to obtaining exculpatory evidence
is the Chinese court system itself. Under Article 17 of the CPL, defendants
using the letters rogatory process are automatically referred to the MOJ for
procuring witnesses, depositions, or other physical evidence. 164  Once a
defendant has petitioned a U.S. court to request the Department of State to
issue letters rogatory pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1781,165 Article 329(1) of the
Supreme People's Court Interpretation of the CPL ("SPC Interpretations")
requires that an American consular official deliver the document to the
Counseling Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn
forwards the request to the "higher people's court" involved.1 66  After
review, "and if the higher people's court deems that it can serve the
documents for the foreign court," the defendant's request is fulfilled, and the
documents circulate in reverse for actual issuance in the U.S.167 If, however,
the higher court determines that the request "is in contradiction with the
sovereignty, security, or social public interests" of the state, it will be
denied.168 Even if the P.R.C. does not invoke the state secrets exception, the
process is time-consuming. In fact, the DOJ itself acknowledges the
inefficiency of letters rogatory, noting that even in favorable circumstances,
and dealing with countries not as guarded as the P.R.C., issuance of
evidence can take up to one year.69
Under Article 325 of the SPC Interpretations, "a foreign court's
request [that] is in contradiction with sovereignty, security or special public
'63 See U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. 1(3).
164 CPL, supra note 141, art. 17, at 46. Under CPL, art. 17, matters of international judicial assistance
are to be deferred to "China's judicial organs," which, as stipulated in the US-China MLAA, is the MOJ.
U.S-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. 11(2),
161 28 U.S.C. § 1781 ("Transmittal of letter rogatory or request").
'6 See SPC Interpretations, supra note 162, art. 329(1) at 247 (noting that all cases involving
"foreign elements" are referred to the higher people's court for adjudication). In the P.R.C., judicial
deliberation is open to influence from the procuracy, Communist Party functionaries, and senior judges of
the Adjudication Committee, a body attached to the court which meets secretly to consider the correctness
of judgments. LUBMAN, supra note 23, at 261-64. "Difficult" or "complex" cases are often referred to a
court's Adjudication Committee. Id. at 166-67.
"7 Id. at 246.
t68 Id. art. 325(2), at 245.
169 See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-13.521(B)
(1988) (informing prosecutors they should "count on as much as a year or more to obtain evidence abroad
pursuant to letters rogatory").
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interest ... shall be rejected."'' 70  With striking circularity, Article 9 of the
CPL Implementation Provisions defines "state secrets" as "cases whose
details or nature involves state secrets.'' With its shield of this "state
secrets" exception, 172 commentators note that the notions of "state secrets"
and "security" have been construed broadly to encompass many contexts, 173
especially those that might involve external interference.174 For this reason,
inquiry into the practices and conditions of the Chinese criminal justice
system often chafes against the Chinese inclination to guard state secrets and
sovereignty. 175  In light of this sensitivity, the MOJ could deny assistance
pursuant to a letters rogatory request citing the "state's secrets" provision for
a wide array of issues that might arise in a criminal matter. Because of this
series of discretionary hurdles, in many cases the criminal defendant will
have no recourse to obtain exculpatory evidence from the P.R.C.
General constraints on defendants' and defense attorneys' access to
witnesses in the P.R.C. for investigative purposes compounds this problem.
Article 325 of the SPC Interpretations is silent with regard to the ability of a
defendant from the United States, through local counsel, to conduct informal
investigations in a criminal matter. 176 In any case, under Article 37 of the
CPL, a defendant can collect statements only with the witness's consent. 1
77
It is impossible to compel testimony from non-consenting private third
parties unless the defendant successfully petitions the procuratorate to
subpoena the witness on the defendant's behalf. 178  Unlike the unlimited
:70 SPC Interpretations, supra note 162, art. 325, at 245.
'71 CPL Implementation Provisions, supra note 144, art. 9, at 133.
72 See generally Timothy A. Galatt, Recent Development: The New State Secrets Law, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 255 (1989). See also HECHT, supra note 22, at 41.
173 See China: Whose Security? "State Security" in China's New Criminal Code, Human Rights'
CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, app. B, 50-52, 102-13 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter China: Whose
Securip].
See H. L. Fu & Richard Cullen, Hong Kong and China: The 1997 Transition: National Security
Law in China, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 453 (1996).
175 See Wang v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1514, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1993), af'd, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Prof. Robert Berring, expert witness, who noted extreme Chinese sensitivity about foreign
criticism of its legal system, and a Chinese official who decried the equitable relief granted to Wang as
"wanton encroachment on China's sovereignty"). See also Daniel C. Turack, The New Chinese Criminal
Justice System, 7 CARIDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 49, 50-51 (1999) (noting that the P.R.C. government
regards the actual number of executions, which exceeded all other countries combined in the 1990's, as a
state secret).
176 But cf SPC Interpretations, supra note 162, art. 320, at 244 (providing for "power of attorney sent
by foreigner, who resides outside the territory of the People's Republic of China, to a Chinese lawyer...
shall be become legally effective after the power of attorney is notarized by a notary organ of the foreign
country, or the foreign affairs department of the foreign country, and also a Chinese embassy or counselor
general to the foreign country").
17 CPL, supra note 141, art. 37, at 55.
'a Id.
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subpoena power enjoyed by the procuratorate,1 79  U.S. defendants, as
represented by local counsel, have no independent subpoena power to take
witness statements. By contrast, the Chinese procuratorate's unlimited
access to evidence is available to U.S. Attorneys.18 The reach of U.S.
Attorneys therefore is potentially unlimited: if the MOJ grants an MLAA
request, Chinese procuratorates can obtain any physical evidence and
compel any witness to testify under Article 45 of the CPL. 8 '
B. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
Without adequate independent access to witnesses and physical
evidence, the opportunity of the defense to confront government witnesses is
crucial. This barrier has broader implications in the U.S-P.R.C. MLAA
context due to the strictness of the Sixth Amendment. 82 In the event that
MPS authorities were unwilling to transfer prisoners like Wang to testify in
U.S. courts, the DOJ could decide to depose a Chinese witness pursuant to
Article 9(3) of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA and Rule 15 whereby out-of-court
statements are deemed admissible as former testimony hearsay
exceptions. 83  In these same cases, however, the widely acknowledged
practice of coercion among Chinese defendants and prisoners may
undermine the opportunity for defense counsel to reliably cross-examine a
Chinese witness under scrutiny of the MPS.
To remedy the difficulty in gathering admissible witness testimony in
criminal cases involving transnational crime, Congress authorizes U.S.
Attorneys and criminal defendants to take depositions abroad under 18
U.S.C. § 3503 and Rule 15.184 The parties are authorized to take depositions
179 Id.
1SO See, e.g., id., art. 89, at 76 (providing for collection of "all evidence concerning criminal suspects
regardless of whether such evidence will prove [guilt]"); CPL, id., art. 92, at 77 (providing for the power to
summon criminal suspect and question up to twelve hours without arrest); CPL, id., art. 98, at 79
(providing obligatory witness testimony under penalty of providing false testimony or concealing criminal
evidence); CPL, id., art. 110, at 81 (obligating citizens to hand over physical evidence to public security
organs).
' See id., art. 45, at 57 (authorizing P.R.C. authorities to collect evidence and take testimony from
all Chinese citizens).
182 See discussion infra Part V.C.
183 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
'84 Prior to 1975, Rule 15 only authorized defendants to take depositions in criminal cases. In 1970,
Congress enacted Title VI of the Organized Crime Control Act, which eventually became 18 U.S.C. §
3503, in an attempt to eliminate what it viewed as an omission in Rule 15. See United States v. Sines, 761
F.2d 1434, 1438 n.5 (lst Cir.1985). Section 3503 authorized the government to take depositions in cases in
which the Attorney General or his designee certifies that the defendant "is believed to have participated in
an organized criminal activity." 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982). In 1974, Rule 15 was amended to expand the
government's authority to take depositions to all criminal actions. The language used in the revised rule is
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"whenever due to exceptional circumstances . . . it is in the interest of justice
that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and
preserved." 18 5  Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 15
provide that whenever a deposition is taken at the behest of the government,
a defendant not in custody and/or his attorney shall have the right to be
present at the examination.'I 6 Both provisions state that a defendant's
"failure, absent good cause shown, to appear [at a deposition] after notice
and tender of expenses ...shall constitute a waiver of [his] right [to be
present] and of any objection to the taking and use of the deposition based
upon that right."' 8 7 Finally, Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(e) provides that depositions
"may be used as substantive evidence if the witness is unavailable .... ,,188
Evidence-gathering abroad pursuant to Rule 15 must comport with the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.'8 9 Under the Confrontation
Clause "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall have the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]"' 90  U.S. courts have not
interpreted this clause rigidly in the international context, because to do so
would completely vitiate the purpose of agreements on mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters. 19' Although courts have cautioned that in the
international context "the right to confrontation is not absolute,"' 92 the
"indicia of reliability" of the Confrontation Clause, enunciated in Green v.
California, persist. 193 These are: (1) to ensure that the witness testifies
under oath; (2) to force the witness to undergo cross-examination; and (3) to
borrowed in part from § 3503, except that there is no requirement that the government certify the case as
involving organized crime figures. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 advisory committee's note, 1974 Amendment;
United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1982).
' 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
116 18 U.S.C. § 3503(b)-(c); FED. R. CRtM. P. 15(b)-(c) (providing that the expenses of travel and
subsistence of the defendant and his attorney for attendance shall be paid by the government).
187 l U.S.C. § 3503(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(b).
18' FED. R. CRjM. P. 15(e). FED. R. EvID. 804(a) provides in pertinent part that a witness is
"unavailable" for a given hearing, if "he ... is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance .. .by process or other reasonable means .... [and] if his...
absence is [not] due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of
preventing [him] from attending or testifying." Additionally, a witness will be considered "unavailable" if
he is exempted by court order on the ground of immunity concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement, or if he persists in refusing to testify despite a court order. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1-2).
"9 See United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 11 (lst Cir. 1997); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d
423,428-29 (6th Cir.1993); Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441.
'90 U.S. CONST. amend. 9.
19' See ABBELL, supra note 15, §2-1, at 2.
192 McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 12. But cf United States v. Drougal, 1 F.3d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1993)
(underscoring that deposition testimony is generally disfavored because it diminishes the defendant's right
to confrontation).
193 See Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441 (upholding Sixth Amendment comportment during deposition taken in
Thailand) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
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permit the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness.1 94  In criminal
proceedings involving ex parte testimony (by a foreign national), the
Confrontation Clause is therefore not violated: (1) where the prosecution
could demonstrate its good faith inability and lack of negligence to procure
the presence of the witness at trial,' 95 or (2) when an opportunity for
effective cross-examination was afforded to the defendant during the
deposition taken abroad.'96
While the Confrontation Clause and hearsay exceptions furnish
similar protections against prejudice to the defendant, the overlap is not
complete. 97 In squaring the two protections, the Court in Ohio v. Roberts
suggested that the former testimony's "[r]eliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception."' 98 The key hearsay exception with respect to foreign depositions
is FRE 804(b)(1), which pertains to former testimony. 99 Courts have not
found the opportunity to cross-examine deficient where the witness was
represented by counsel and testified at a preliminary hearing in a
disinterested court. 20  Although the Green Court did not conclusively define
"opportunity, ' '2° 1 its most forceful formulation of "an opportunity" to cross-
examine was that prior statements are admissible if "given under
circumstances closely approximating those that surround a typical trial
' 20 2
such that cross-examination be "full and effective." 20 3  In the context of
foreign depositions, courts have upheld the admissibility of videotaped
194 Id.
'9' McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 12-13 (noting that such good-faith efforts need not be "heroic" as long as
"reasonable alternative measures can adequately preserve the values that underpin the defendant's
confrontation rights").
19 See, e.g., id. at 13; Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441. United States v. Gifford, 892 F.2d 263, 264 (3rd Cit.
1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990) (defendant was linked to deposition in Belgium through two
telephone lines, to be able to listen to the testimony by virtue of an open telephone line, and simultaneously
be able to confer with his attorney through the use of a private line).
197 See Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 (noting the historical impetus of the right to confrontation stemmed
from a dissatisfaction with trying defendants based solely on ex parte testimony). See also Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
198 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). See also McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 13.
'99 Under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), former testimony does not fall within a hearsay exception unless:
"[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition
taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
200 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71; Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
201 In dicta, Justice Brennan suggested that "perhaps .... [a] mere face-to-face encounter is
sufficient" to satisfy confrontation. Green, 399 U.S. at 200 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf Roberts, 448
U.S. at 70 (declining to address this suggestion raised by the Green Court with respect to whether the
"mere" opportunity to cross-examine rendered the prior testimony admissible).
202 Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
... Id. at 158.
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depositions 2° 4 and accurate transcripts as adequate alternative means of
preserving witness demeanor for the jury.2 °5
In the Chinese context, the opportunity to cross-examine required
under 804(b)(1) may be deficient even if the traditional "indicia of
reliability" under Green20 6 are formally present. Despite Chinese criminal
procedure reforms, individuals remain subject to coercive police practices
207
while in custody. The witness is susceptible to coercion should P.R.C.
authorities seek to influence the witness' testimony in a manner that suits
Chinese policy. 20 8 Following the admission by the Chinese witness in Wang
that MPS coercive practices had shaped his testimony, it is foreseeable that
the Chinese authorities would be reluctant to send any witness to the U.S.
who might, inadvertently or otherwise, compromise state security.2 °9
Though the facts of Wang emerged in 1993, the latest U.S. Department of
State Country Report on Human Rights Practices: China notes various
reports of the on-going practice of torture, coerced confessions, and
mistreatment of arrestees, detainees and prisoners by the MPS and other
police and security agencies.
210
If the U.S. government cannot procure the Chinese witness, under
McKeeve, it must provide for effective cross-examination of the deponent
204 See e.g., Walker, 1 F.3d at 428-29 (holding no violation of confrontation where defendants refused
to travel to Japan due to likelihood of foreign prosecution, and where defendants' attorneys were present to
cross-examine witness during videotaped deposition); Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441-42 (holding no Sixth
Amendment violation when U.S. defense counsel was present in Thailand for deposition at U.S.
government expense, and defendant refused to travel to personally confront deponent/co-conspirator for
fear of Thai indictment for heroin smuggling).
205 See e.g., McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 17-18 (finding no infringement on right to confrontation when
British witness refused to testify in the United States, and where the defendant's attorney was present in
United Kingdom during deposition with telephonic link to U.S. defendant and trained British judicial
officer recorded verbatim transcript); United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 685-89 (E.D.N.Y 1987)
(finding sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness when, pursuant to French law, French judge conducted
questioning of the witness, had the examination recorded using French and Farsi interpreters in a less than
verbatim transcript, and permitted the non-French-speaking U.S. Court Reporter to observe deposition).
256 Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
207 See HECHT, supra note 22, at 54 (stating that the limited availability of counsel under CPL creates
ample risk of coerced "confessions"). Although coerced statements are forbidden under CPL, art. 43, the
statute neither explicitly provides for sanctions nor imposes an exclusionary rule for involuntary statements
or physical evidence illegally seized. For legislative history of CPL, see LuO, supra note 141, at 24.
208 E.g., Wang v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff d, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
1996) (describing torture of Wang). Wang is further described as being flanked by MPS agents during
interview with DEA agents who were present without U.S. translator. Id. at 1521.
209 In Wang, the apparently sensitive information that the MPS authorities feared Wang would leak by
testifying truthfully was the source of the heroin from inside P.R.C. territory. See Wang, 837 F. Supp. at
1513.
210 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE COUNTRY REPT. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA, sec. I(c)
("Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment") (2001) available at
www.state.gov/gldrllrls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm (last visited Jan.29, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE P.R.C. COUNTRY REPT.].
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rule. 211 Article 9(3) of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA permits the taking of
depositions "in a manner agreed to by the Requested Party insofar as not
contrary to the laws of the Requested Party.''212  If the P.R.C. is the
Requested Party, under its laws the MOJ could stipulate that MPS agents
monitor each observation,213 especially as P.R.C. authorities often regard
external inquiry into the criminal justice system as implicating national
security. 214  In addition to official sensitivity about foreign interference,
corruption itself might motivate certain MPS or other police officers to
215ensure that a Chinese witness testified in a certain way.
If the deponent is a defendant in a related Chinese criminal matter,
and testified favorably according to Chinese policy considerations, MPS
authorities would be in a position to grant leniency to the deponent-
defendant, prior to commencement of the prosecution 2 16  More important,
the MPS would have advanced notice of the nature of the request, though
not necessarily a copy of the interrogatories, with which to steer the
responses of the witness under their control.217 Even if videotaped, as in
211 See McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 13.
212 U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. IX(3).
213 P.R.C. officials retain considerable discretionary authority to block attorney access and monitor
attorney-client meetings. See HECHT, supra note 22, at 41 (noting an expansive definition of "state secrets"
in China). Under CPL, supra note 141, art. 96, a state functionary may be present when a defense attorney
is interviewing a criminal suspect in a case involving state secrets. In the case of U.S. prosecutors and U.S.
defense counsel deposing a Chinese witness in P.R.C. custody, Chinese authorities could insist that MPS
observers would be warranted under SPC Interpretation, supra note 162, art. 325, which provides that a
request "in contradiction with sovereignty, security, or social public interests."
214 For instance, the annual number of executions in the People's Republic of China is a state secret.
See China: Whose Security, supra note 173, app. B, 50-52, 102-13 (translating crimes of endangering state
security, analyzing the concept of endangering state security, and examining other relevant security laws,
including the State Security Law and the State Secrets Law).
215 See PEERENBOOM, supra note 22, at 406-08 (noting multifarious forms of Chinese corruption
unchecked by weak courts); LUBMAN, supra note 23, at 171 (citing reports that Chinese Communist Party
members are willing to cover up offenses of fellow members). See also discussion supra Part II. It is also
important to note that while MPS authorities in Beijing may publicly denounce such practices, the MPS is
often ill-equipped to enforce sanctions against officers in the provinces. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 22,
at 414-16.
216 The "investigatory" period prior to the formal proceeding can be extended for lengthy periods to
meet state needs. See, e.g., CPL, supra note 141, art. 69(3), at 66 (allowing for maximum of seven days
before the procuratorate must authorize an official arrest); CPL, supra note 141, art. 127 (2)-(3), at 66
(providing for post-arrest detention for a maximum of two months pending an indictment, with the
possibility of an extension of an additional two months "for crimes punishable by sentences of ten years or
longer" or "involving gangs" ); CPL, supra note 141, art. 125, at 85 (permitting supplementary
investigation to extend detention for an addition month, or further indefinite delays "for certain special
reasons"). See also Wang, 837 F. Supp. at 1514-23 (postponing commencement of formal proceeding for
six months to permit Wang's travel to the United States to testify). During this pending investigation, MPS
officials can use sentence reduction as incentive to testify according to policy. See id. at 1551.217 The arrangements are somewhat negotiable under U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art IX(3).
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218Sines, or recorded in a verbatim transcript by a trained judicial officer as
in McKeeve,219 the strong potential for coercion undermines the reliability of
such deposition testimony despite the demonstrable "indicia" under Green v.
California.220 Under scrutiny of MPS officials, a deponent who struck a deal
to testify falsely would be under enormous pressure to perjure himself. The
choice faced by Wang-perjury and a reduced sentence versus the harshest
consequences for leaking sensitive information--could be replicated in these
depositions. The difference between Wang and these hypothetical cases
would be the missing neutrality of a disinterested court to protect the witness
and better enable truthfulness.
22
'
This parade of horribles is intended to emphasize the possibility that a
deposition of a Chinese witness, taken in the hypothetical setting, might not
meet the formal "indicia of reliability" recognized in the McKeeve line of
foreign deposition cases. 222  Yet the circumstances of such a deposition
would in no way "closely approximat[e] those that surround a typical trial
[in the United States]."' 223  In the event of such unchecked untruthfulness,
defendants in U.S. proceedings, though represented by counsel at
depositions, might be unable to adequately confront government witnesses
in the repressive atmosphere of a Chinese jailhouse. If such depositions
were admitted, especially as probative of central issues, it would be a
violation of the right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, and
derivatively, due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.2
24
211 Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441. It should be noted that courts have not necessarily required videotaping
as a condition precedent for admitting foreign testimony. See, e.g, McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 17-18 (holding
that video recording was not necessary for purposes of confrontation especially when the host country
prohibits taping); Salim, 664 F. Supp. at 691-92 (finding sufficient observation of witness demeanor by a
non-French-speaking U.S. Court Reporter).
219 McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 17-18.
220 Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (citing factors of witness's oath, opportunity to cross-examine, and a jury's
ability to view witness demeanor).
221 It would be unimaginable for a witness to respond in the affirmative to the defense counsel's
question: "Were your statements here coerced?" For discussion of the sensitivity about these coercive
practices, see tactical avoidance exercised by DEA agents Aiu and Swenson in negotiating the witness
transfer in Wang, 837 F. Supp. at 1551-53.
222 As noted, these cases featured depositions in countries that are not notorious for coercive
practices, and where the presumption of fair treatment remains. See, e.g., McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 13 (U.K.);
Walker, 1 F.3d at 428-29 (Japan); Sines, 761 F.2d at 1441-1442 (Thail.). It is also worth noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court has held the trial court's failure to ensure cross-examination of a complaining witness
with a motive to lie violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S.
227, 232 (1988).
223 Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
224 Id. at 186 n.20 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (excluding evidence where
pretrial confrontation was so infected by suggestiveness as to give rise to an irreparable likelihood of
misidentification) and United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (disallowing conviction
where the critical issues at trial were supported only by ex parte testimony not subjected to cross-
examination, and not found to be reliable by the trial judge)).
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C. Possible Remedies
Criminal defense attorneys, civil libertarians, and the American Bar
Association ("ABA") have decried the DOJ's failure to afford defendants
access to evidence abroad through affirmative MLAT provisions.225 The
ABA has proposed that every MLAT adopt the necessity standard from Fed.
R. Crim. P. 15(a) and "expressly permit a criminal defendant to use the
treaty [or agreement] to obtain evidence from the Requested country to use
in their defense if they can make a showing of necessity to the trial court., 226
The DOJ has characterized this proposition as vying for a defendant's
"unfettered use of MLATs to obtain evidence abroad., 227 Although
"unfettered use" seems to exaggerate the ABA position,228 the DOJ's
response that it has "approved" and "volunteered" use of MLAT pursuant to
Rule 15 motions granted to the defendant, as in Des Marteau, is the most
persuasive response to these criticisms.
229
Affording a defendant equally efficient access through the U.S.-
P.R.C. MLAA removes some barriers to gathering evidence abroad. More
important, it circumvents the predictably time-consuming process of letters
rogatory. This corrects the imbalance in evidence-gathering capacity that
currently flaws the agreement. The defendant could invoke the authority of
the MLAA to extend subpoena power via Chinese procuratorates 230 to
interview witnesses, gather bank and business records, and request directly
225 See Abbell, supra note 100, at 21. In 1988, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, Criminal Section of the American Bar Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union
formed an ABA House Delegation to voice these concerns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which was considering the ratification of six MLATs. Id. See also NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 471;
Zagaris & Resnick, supra note 52, at 20 (citing Abbell's testimony that "it was neither fair nor consistent
with the compulsory process clause . . . to require defendants to continue to rely on letters rogatory when
prosecutors had available the advantages of the MLAT").
226 See Abbell, supra note 100, at 21 (quoting ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION REPT. No. 109
(1989)). FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) requires that the defendant demonstrate that "due to exceptional
circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice" that deposition testimony or physical evidence be
obtained abroad. See also Drogoul, I F.3d 1546 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a party requesting Rule 15
order bears the burden of persuasion as to necessity).
221 See S. EXEC. REP. No. 24, at 10 (2d Sess. 1996) [hereinafter AUSTRIAN REPORT]. The DOJ also
claims that an affirmative MLAT provision affording defendant access (1) would deter countries from
entering into MLATs with the U.S., (2) would be unnecessary because defendants have greater access to
evidence than the government, (3) would be redundant because defendants already have access pursuant to
letters rogatory, (4) that government itself does not have compulsory process, and thus the defendant's
parallel right cannot be denied, and (5) "no court has adopted the legal reasoning" to support a core
constitutional critique under the compulsory clause. See id at 9-11.
228 See Abbell, supra note 100, at 22.221 See, e.g. Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D., at 372 n.5; AUSTRIAN REPORT, supra note 227, at 11.
230 See CPL, supra note 141, art. 45, at 57 (providing for unlimited authority to collect evidence from
P.R.C. citizen).
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any other physical evidence held by Chinese authorities. If the defendant
could then satisfy the many hearsay exceptions under FRE 803 and 804, this
evidence would be admissible at trial.23' In cases where coercion might be
present, the defendant could request the transfer of the Chinese witness to
the United States to testify. Even if the MOJ denied the defendant
assistance, it would still be obligated to justify the denial to the Central
Authority and, by inclusion, the defendant.232 Finally, this increased
independence would allow the defendant to be more vigilant against
prosecutorial misconduct evinced in the Wang case.233 Accordingly, fairer
trials in the United States would result.
Such an express provision might also have policy ramifications. By
incorporating the necessity standard of Rule 15 expressly into the U.S.-
P.R.C.-MLAA, as proposed by the ABA Delegation, the U.S. government
could impart a policy that includes a dimension of individual legal rights
into the binding U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA. Under SPC Interpretation 326 of the
CPL, moreover, P.R.C. authorities would be obligated to produce evidence
pursuant to the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA.235 Such an approach would be different
from usual criticisms of the Chinese criminal justice system, which
emphasize the lack of protections for criminal defendants under a rights-
based standard.236  By engaging with the P.R.C., the United States could
appeal to the pragmatic interests of crime control served by the MLAA,
while also attaching the necessary condition of equal access to evidence and
witness statements that are not suspect as fruits of coercion. The U.S.-
P.R.C. MLAA's forfeiture provision 237 would sweeten the inducement to
uphold such constitutional standards while promoting crime control.
231 See, e.g,, FED. R. EVID. 803 (1-23) ("Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial")
FED. R. EVID. 804(B)(1-4) ("Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable").
232 See U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. 111(3) (requiring notice to requesting party, with reasons
for denial of assistance).
233 See Wang, 837 F. Supp. at 1553-58.
234 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. See also Abbell, supra note 100, at 21 (citing ABA resolution).
Modifications are permitted under the U.S.-P.R.C.-MLAA. U.S.-P.R.C.-MLAA, supra note 1, art.
XXHI(1) (stating that after three years in force the agreement shall renew every successive five years,
unless either party notifies within six months of the period's termination its desires to enter into
consultations to modify the agreement).
235 See SPC Interpretations, supra note 162, art. 326 at 246. But see U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note
1, art. III(1)(c) (designating that requests that "would prejudice the sovereignty, security, public order
(ordre publique), important public policy or other essential interests of the Request Party" may be denied).
236 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE P.R.C. COUNTRY REPT., supra note 210.
237 See U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, supra note 1, art. XVI (providing mutual assistance in forfeiture
proceedings).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The dramatic increase in crime in the P.R.C. has direct impact on the
United States as organized transnational groups expand markets beyond
Chinese borders. The U.S government has a legitimate interest in stemming
the flow of narcotics, aliens, and other contraband across its borders. The
U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA is an effective response to the globalization of
criminality from the P.R.C. Given the MLAT in place with Hong Kong, it
serves to close the gap in broadening the procedural framework for
cooperative prosecution in East Asia.
The political offense exception of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA anticipates
differing values in substantive criminal law and enforcement. 8  By
expressly limiting the scope of the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA, the United States
insulates itself from direct complicity in prosecuting political offenses
considered repugnant under the U.S. system of law. It also serves a
progressive purpose in refusing to cooperate with this dimension of Chinese
criminal law enforcement. Under Nadelmann's rubric, this deliberate
forbearance effects a de-harmonization between the U.S. and Chinese
criminal justice systems. 2
39
The impact of this enhanced prosecutorial power, however, may
endanger the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment and due process rights
in U.S. proceedings. Without providing the defendant access to evidence in
the P.R.C., the effectiveness in streamlining prosecutorial assistance under
the U.S.-P.R.C. MLAA tilts the balance of adversarial forces in a U.S. trial
in favor of the prosecution, infringing upon the defendant's rights of the
compulsory process. Absent an express MLAA provision for defendants, or
better DOJ assurances that requests for evidence will be vigorously made to
240
the Chinese MOJ, ad hoc discretionary Rule 15 orders are insufficient.
Worse, the default access through letters rogatory may afford the defendant
no access at all. Because of the very flexible P.R.C. "state secrets"
exception, concerted Sino-American prosecutorial efforts could result in the
de facto inability of defendants to obtain exculpatory evidence from the
P.R.C. contrary to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
241process.
With a defendant's independent access to evidence severely
circumscribed, the opportunity to confront U.S. government witnesses in the
... U.S.-P.R.C MLAA, supra note 1, art. III(1)(d).
239 See discussion supra Part III.C.
240 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
241 See discussion supra Part V.A.
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P.R.C. becomes crucial. Despite formally demonstrating the "indicia of
reliability, ' 242 however, a deposition taken in the P.R.C. may not
substantively allow a defendant to confront a U.S. government witness in
custody there. The widely acknowledged police practice of coercion among
Chinese defendants and prisoners may undermine the genuine opportunity
for defense counsel to reliably cross-examine a Chinese witness under
scrutiny of the MPS.243 This lack of a guarantee of trustworthiness may
infringe on the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
With a defendant's access through the U.S-P.R.C. MLAA based upon
the Rule 15 standard, the DOJ could combine an efficient exchange of
evidence with constitutional safeguards. The prosecutorial reach enhanced
through the MLAA could match the borderless range of transnational
criminal organizations while preserving a defendant's access to exculpatory
evidence. If Nadelmann is correct that MLATs are a driving force behind
the "harmonization," and thus "Americanization" of international law
enforcement, 24 4 this process will remain incomplete until U.S. constitutional
protections accompany this flexed power abroad to ensure fundamental trial
fairness at home.
242 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
243 See discussion supra Part V.B.
244 NADELMANN, supra note 12, at 470.
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